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As the discussion surrounding misinformation and polarization takes
center stage, one space that has been largely overlooked is the Chinese
media sphere within the United States, where questionable content has
garnered a loyal following among Chinese-speaking immigrants. While
headlines with false claims such as “Illegal immigrant started wildfire
in Sonoma County” mirror types of misinformation found in American,
English-language media, what’s especially worrisome in information
ecosystems like these is their central influence on the first-generation
immigrant experience and integration with US society. Yet, they exist
very much as unknown, parallel universes for most researchers, jour-
nalists, and media watchers. With the rise of conservatism among
first-generation Chinese immigrants, one of the fastest growing popu-
lations in the United States, this media space—led by mobile platform
WeChat—offers key clues to how political information and misinforma-
tion are constructed for and distributed among the emerging political
constituency.
This report sheds light on the nature of misinformation and polit-
ical polarization in the WeChat news sphere. The conclusions drawn
from this preliminary investigation into WeChat mirror more general
challenges with misinformation and polarization in the digital news
ecosystem, but also highlight the specificity of the information problem
for the immigrant population.
Key findings
WeChat has a highly specific issue agenda in its coverage. Compared
to English-speaking media and immigrant Chinese media, affirmative
action/census data disaggregation and unauthorized immigration are
the disproportionate focus of WeChat content, while jobs, the economy,
and healthcare received little attention during the period of study. This
divergence in issue priorities—without counteracting narratives—leaves
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room for misinformation to fester around dominant topics on WeChat.
Political discourse on WeChat can be described as asymmetrically
polarized, with the right leading in volume, reach, and skewed issue
agenda. Both conservative and liberal discourses on WeChat centered
around race relations and the ambivalent role of Chinese Americans.
But it was the conservative narrative, invoking zero-sum calculations
and the neglect of Chinese Americans by liberals, that seems to res-
onate more widely.
Low barrier to entry on WeChat has generated a profusion of content
publishers native to the platform and intense competition for atten-
tion. The abundance of revenue-driven content published, coupled with
partisan forces, makes WeChat especially vulnerable to political misin-
formation. Emotionally stirring, sensational stories become amplified
through the replication and embellishment of a long tail of WeChat
outlets, which creates repetition and familiarity.
Misinformation inside WeChat takes on a pronounced local expres-
sion. Local news and information outlets contribute heavily to the
spread of misinformation. Local stories and policies especially fall prey
to distorted information, when lack of local news coverage on issues of
particular interest to immigrant Chinese leaves a vacuum for misinfor-
mation to flourish.
The information problem on WeChat intersects with and draws
rhetorical and ideological resources from both US and China-based
platforms and online publics. While misinformation can be relayed from
the far-right in the US, it can also be strengthened by discourses and
online communities on Chinese equivalents of Reddit and Quora.
Chat groups, especially large ones where members are acquaintances
or complete strangers connected by a common affiliation, are abundant
and central in information dissemination. At a time when mobile mes-
saging apps are increasingly utilized for news, WeChat highlights the
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significance of socially driven, organically spread information mostly
unaffected by algorithms and technological manipulation.
WeChat’s information problem highlights the challenge of immigrant
political integration, where difference in values and interests and a dis-
tinct communication system compound the distribution and consump-
tion of misinformation. More than technological solutions, combating
misinformation for immigrant audiences requires engaging with and
ultimately bridging their experiences and perspectives.
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“George Soros backed the violent clash in Charlottesville.”
“Illegal immigrant started wildfire in Sonoma County.”
“You could be receiving HIV positive blood in California now!”
Headlines such as these, some conspiratorial and emotionally charged
and other verifiably false, have become a rampant and well-recognized
feature of today’s information environment. But instead of the usual
habitats for misinformation such as Facebook and Twitter, these exam-
ples are translations of articles found on WeChat, the ascendant mobile
messaging and content publishing app among immigrant Chinese in the
United States. These headlines do not represent the prevailing discourse
within Chinese-language news, but there is no doubt that the divisive
and strident political messages in the past election cycle have found
their way into the immigrant Chinese news sphere and gained an in-
dependent existence. Their presence begs the question of what kind of
misinformation exists in this space, as well as how it is generated and
distributed.
Ethnic media—media produced by and for an ethnic group—plays
an especially pivotal role for immigrant acculturation and integration.1 2
The cumulative evidence from the research literature suggests that
ethnic media is crucial in introducing immigrants to social norms and
political knowledge in their host society, while also helping immigrants
to maintain connections with, and consolidate, their ethnic identity
and community.3.4 In multiethnic America, overlooking non-English-
speaking media in the discussion of misinformation means missing an
opportunity to understand how political discourse is constructed for
a significant segment of the political constituents, and to build media
narratives that are sensitive and inclusive.
The added impetus for studying ethnic Chinese media stems from
a rise in conservatism among first-generation Chinese. Although no
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quantitative assessment exists to date, activism by conservative Chinese
Americans has been ardent and vocal, and as a curious phenomenon
has already garnered the attention of mainstream media.5 6 To be sure,
Asian Americans still overwhelmingly lean liberal Democrat.7 And I do
not wish to suggest that misinformation is inherently a phenomenon
on the right. Instead, this report underscores the rise of conservatism
as a significant shift in Chinese-American politics that suggests height-
ened polarization. Polarization and misinformation manifest as two
entangled dimensions: misinformation can drive polarization, and po-
larization creates ripe opportunities for the generation and spread of
misinformation.
This study focused on WeChat because it is a distinctive infrastruc-
ture for content production and dissemination. With its massive reach,
it likely shapes the landscape of political information for immigrant
Chinese. What follows is a preliminary assessment of this Chinese-
language platform and manifestations of its information problem. The
conclusions drawn mirror general challenges with misinformation and
polarization in the digital news ecosystem, but also highlight the speci-




This report draws on a survey conducted in August 2017 with 407
US-based Chinese WeChat users to understand how they encounter
political information within WeChat. The survey helped to identify
twenty-five WeChat outlets that its respondents deemed important
to their understanding of current affairs and politics in the United
States. Survey participants were recruited from Chinese organizations
and Chinese-language school mailing lists, as well as within WeChat
through snowball sampling. Twenty-three follow-up interviews were
conducted to further examine how users interact with WeChat outlets
and participate in chat groups.
The findings are also informed by a content analysis of twenty-five
WeChat news outlets that emerged from our user survey as top venues
for social and political news about the United States. The analysis in-
cludes all published content in these WeChat outlets—3,837 articles in
total—for the period of September to November 2017. (See Appendix
B for a full list of these outlets.) Lack of API and web archives limited
the ability to analyze a larger time frame. To serve as a comparison,
front-page articles on three long-standing Chinese media outlets in the
US (World Journal, Singtao Daily, and China Press) were also included
in the analysis.
While many of these WeChat outlets provide a mix of gossip, infor-
mation, and news, a few specialize in politics and have come to occupy
opposite ends of the political spectrum. These included three right-
leaning news accounts and four left-leaning accounts, which will be
introduced in more detail later. I focused on these outlets and analyzed
their content between January and November 2017.
Using computer-assisted coding, the articles were analyzed for their
coverage of key social and political issues, as well as connections be-
tween these issues, political parties, and groups; racial and identity-
based groups; and terms denoting values. Care was taken to include
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code words and terminologies peculiar to the Chinese-language polit-
ical discourse. Some examples include shabaitian (“sweet and dumb,”
which can be roughly equated with libtards) and hepingjiao (“religion
of peace,” a derogatory phrase for Islam). (For a list of terms, see Ap-
pendix A.) Using Gephi, semantic networks were constructed to demon-
strate the co-occurrence of these terms.
In addition, two research assistants and I flagged and tracked ques-
tionable content pertaining to US social and political issues on WeChat
from September to November 2017, as an exercise in teasing out overar-
ching features of misinformation. The idea of misinformation is fraught
with definitional issues and troubled by ideological interpretation.8 Be-
cause our approach was not meant to be exhaustive, we worked with
a loose definition of misinformation that includes false, highly biased,
and hyperbolic claims. With stories that got flagged, we used a special-
ized external search engine (Sogou) to search for similar occurrences on
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With 889 million monthly active users,9 WeChat is the social media
of choice in mainland China, governing aspects of life from social net-
working and messaging to takeout orders and personal finance. Offering
features reminiscent of WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter all at once,
it combines the intimacy of mobile messaging and small-group inter-
actions with the capacity for viral dissemination. The significance of
WeChat for the present analysis lies in its infrastructure for the genera-
tion and distribution of native content.
In the last official count in April 2017, there were as many as ten
million official accounts (OA), or what I refer to in this report as
WeChat outlets.10 They publish a staggering amount of content for
users, and some have come to rival established media in influence.11
From individual bloggers and citizen journalists to brands and media
companies, many have leveraged the low barrier to entry and vastness
of the user base to create content, making WeChat an increasingly cen-
tral source of news for Chinese-language users. Unlike platforms for
social news like Facebook and Twitter, WeChat operates as a more
enclosed and private ecosystem. As the report will discuss, informa-
tion sharing and discovery takes place within networks of friends and
acquaintances, with minimal influence from hashtags, trending news,
and other forms of technological manipulation. Even interactions be-
tween users and WeChat outlets are mostly private—commenting on
an article is not always enabled, and outlet managers determine which
comments get displayed publicly. These design features are central in
defining the generation and dissemination of information and misinfor-
mation on WeChat.
The WeChat news outlets selected for analysis in my research all fo-
cus on current affairs in the United States. They vary greatly in terms
of scale of operation and quality. On one end, there are individual or
boutique operations, with one writer or a small base of individual con-
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tributors delivering a mix of news, analysis, and opinions. Larger oper-
ations have more substantial, full-time editorial teams that consistently
churn out content. These could be overseas outposts of established
China-based media (e.g., Insight China, a subsidiary of Global Times)
or WeChat startups, the most notable example of which is College
Daily, a formidable player backed by angel funding.12 Six local news
and information outlets topped user nominations as influential sources
of news, with geographical focus on cities with major concentrations of
immigrant Chinese such as New York, Houston, Atlanta, Seattle, and
cities in California. I highlight these locally oriented outlets here be-
cause they make a special reappearance later in this report as a type of





Out of the many issues defining the contours of political discourse in
the United States, twelve were examined for their relative prominence
in the WeChat media ecosystem. Muslims/Islam, terrorism, and affir-
mative action/census data disaggregation topped the focus of WeChat
content, followed by jobs/the economy and undocumented immigration
(Figure 1).
Figure 1.
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Of course, issue agenda could be subject to changes in the news cy-
cle. To put this in perspective, the same search terms were used to
query a collection of English-language media in Media Cloud,13 includ-
ing mainstream media, regional media, online news, digital natives,
and political blogs, for the same period (September–November 2017).
Leading the English-speaking media agenda were jobs and the economy,
healthcare, Muslim/Islam, terrorism, and climate change (Figure 2). It
should be noted that the English-speaking media agenda here serves as
a benchmark for the Chinese counterpart and should not be interpreted
on its own, given that results were subject to the specific time period
analyzed and search terms used. For example, “immigration reform”
was not included as a search term to ensure focus on undocumented
immigration and exclude topics such as H1B visas, which likely explains
the relatively scant coverage of undocumented immigration in English-
speaking media.
Figure 2.
The divergence in issue priorities between English- and Chinese-
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language media is stark. Without delving into how these issues are
framed, the salience of an issue agenda in the media often signals to
audiences what to think about.14 Particularly striking was the discrep-
ancy between the two media spheres’ attention on affirmative action
and census data disaggregation. This was the third most covered topic
in WeChat with coverage almost equal to the two top issues (Mus-
lim/Islam and terrorism). Meanwhile, affirmative action and census
data disaggregation hardly registered a blip on the English-speaking
media radar. Searching for census disaggregation as a topic by itself
returned zero results in this time period.
At the intersection of education and race relations, affirmative ac-
tion and census disaggregation have become two signature issues that
first-generation Chinese rally around and debate. Census disaggregation
refers to bills introduced in states like California, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island, which proposed to distinguish different Asian American
Pacific Island (AAPI) sub-groups in demographic data collection. Given
the vast linguistic and economic differences among the AAPI popula-
tion, doing so helps expose disparities that have long existed within
this group. For opponents of the bill, this paves the way for affirmative
action to further disadvantage Chinese Americans—who have higher
education attainment compared to some other Asian groups—in college
admissions. Complexities of these issues aside, the fixation on affirma-
tive action and census disaggregation on WeChat is conspicuous. The
striking invisibility of these issues in English-speaking media signals a
disconnect in mainstream coverage.
Unauthorized immigration was also a more prominent issue on
WeChat, compared to how issues lined up in English-language media.
Although some content touched on the DACA debate, it was sanctuary
laws, appearing in seventy percent of the WeChat content on unau-
thorized immigration, that anchored the discussion of this issue. The
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salience of sanctuary laws in the WeChat media agenda could also be
explained by its application in California, where a large concentration
of first-generation Chinese resides, and the sensational stories that pro-
duced the trope of California as a liberal haven for criminals. I dissect
this point with a concrete case on misinformation later in this report.
It is also worth noting that WeChat’s issue agenda does not align
with or represent that of immigrant Chinese media overall. In Chinese
ethnic press coverage of jobs, the economy, and healthcare far outpaced
other topics (Figure 3). Arguably, operating as traditional newsrooms,
ethnic press generated a more conventional news agenda. WeChat,
separated from conventional media practices and structures, put forth
content more divergent from the coverage by legacy ethnic press and
English-language media. The specificity of WeChat’s content may con-
tribute to a gap in issue agenda between immigrant Chinese and the
wider public. When coverage of an issue is dominant on WeChat but
not in Chinese ethnic media or English-language media, such as in the
case of affirmative action and undocumented immigration, this also
leaves room for misinformation to fester without counteracting narra-
tives.
The presence of partisan outlets on WeChat also played a role in
constructing these issues and bolstering their salience. In the next sec-
tion, I discuss political polarization on WeChat to set the scene for
the dynamics of misinformation on the platform. Although partisan
WeChat outlets only constitute one part of the platform and cater to
more politically active audiences, their reach is significant and the po-
litical discourses constructed by these outlets intersect with and have
resonances in the WeChat ecosystem more broadly.
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Figure 3.




For the politically initiated on WeChat, the phenomenon of polariza-
tion is difficult to miss and manifests rather radically through a blend
of punditry and provocation. Seven WeChat outlets were identified
by the survey respondents as vehicles of partisan politics. This report
refers to them as right-leaning and left-leaning outlets. These labels
broadly mirror the political divide in US politics, albeit with some dis-
tinctions in emphasis in immigrant Chinese politics, as we will see. The
conservative WeChat sphere is led by two associated accounts, Voice of
North American Chinese (VNAC) and Civil Rights, as well as a similar
but distinct account, confusingly named Voice of Chinese Americans
(VCA). In the months leading up to the 2016 election, these accounts
quickly solidified readership among pro-Trump Chinese.
The left-leaning accounts include yet another confusingly named
outlet, Chinese Americans. These names in fact testify to one of the
defining characteristics of partisan politics for immigrant Chinese: ac-
tivism. These outlets formed in response to several key events in Chi-
nese activism, including rallies against talk show host Jimmy Kimmel’s
China joke,15 mobilizations opposing SCA-5, California’s bill to rein-
state affirmative action, and protests against the indictment of Peter
Liang, a Chinese-American police officer charged with the shooting of
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an African-American man. Before they became content-producing out-
lets, they were WeChat networks calling for action, which convened a
base of supporters ready to be engaged as readers. The naming of these
accounts and their connection with activism in response to discrimina-
tion reflects the primacy of the Chinese-American identity in defining
their politics. And these politics are very contentious, as reactions to
discrimination have engendered both conservative and progressive vi-
sions.
The other three outlets on the left—iAmElection, Anti-Rumor, and
NoMelonGroup—were started by a collective of writers who intensified
their efforts in response to the popularity of the right-leaning discourses
on WeChat. Content generated by these partisan outlets and my per-
sonal exchange with their editors show that the two sides are keenly
conscious of each other and engage in an ongoing rhetorical battle.
Looking at these outlets, WeChat may be described as asymmet-
rically polarized, with conservative content leading the scoreboard in
volume and reach, as well as narrower and more aggressive in its ide-
ological expression. On average, the right-leaning outlets on WeChat
churned out 384 articles per month, drawing an average of 6,060 views
per article in the period analyzed. In comparison, left-leaning outlets
generated less content (eighty-seven articles per month), with even the
most-read account trailing VNAC by a few thousand (Table 1).
Table 1.
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Issue agenda was highly skewed on the right (Figure 4). The scope
of issues clustered around Islam and affirmative action/census disaggre-
gation, with the two accounting for about forty-four percent of its con-
tent. Negligible attention was paid to gun control, climate change, and
reproductive rights. As an issue that has motivated Asian-American
Republican voters in the past,16 jobs and the economy only made up six
percent of the content on the right. Healthcare garnered even less at-
tention. This is not to suggest that the economy and healthcare do not
constitute the ideological expression of Chinese conservatism, but rather
demonstrates the singularity of content focus by right-leaning outlets.
In contrast, left-leaning outlets had a more even distribution of top-
ics. The economy and healthcare were covered on par with the other
top issues. Climate change and reproductive rights also received sub-
stantial attention. To illustrate further, the ten most viewed stories
from these outlets spanned taxation, education policy, healthcare, the
travel ban, and the Women’s March. The headlines in Table 2 and
Table 3 provide a taste of the style and perspective in these partisan
outlets.
In particular, the right on WeChat devoted almost one-fourth of
its content to covering Islam. Not surprisingly, this is a topic plagued
by different genres of misinformation. For example, an article with
48,664 views was headlined, “The Muslim takeover of America. Part
1.” It opened by describing a congressman from Minnesota swearing
in on the Quran, and went on to caution against the rising number of
Muslim voters and Muslims running for office. Obvious prejudice aside,
this article exemplifies the complex choreography of misinformation.
The photo of the congressman swearing in was accompanied by a link
from Snopes, which rated the claim as mostly true, but clarified that
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Headline Views
“Breaking: Shooting rampage reported in Northern California,
transportation down”
100000*
“Shocking: Terrorist explosions in the UK, several tens of
people dead, Manchester Stadium becoming hell on earth”
100000
“Breaking: Multiple Republican congressmen shot, near a
hundred shots fired!”
100000
“Urgent: Mass riots to hit many cities in the US” 100000*
“Is Islam really a religion of peace? Let scripture, history, and
statistics give you the real answer”
100000
“Federal court rules against city—Mosque construction ruins
local real estate”
83463
“Trump speech at the UN: Put your country and people first!” 80892*
“‘Chinese hero used martial arts to tackle terrorists in the
London attack.”
75000
“Senior immigrants on payroll in China receive welfare bene-
fits in the US. What do you think?”
67985
“The most dangerous man has become the President of
France. Human civilization is falling off the cliffs!”
63830*
*WeChat displays view count larger than 100,000 as 100,000+
Table 2. Top performing stories on US politics from the right
religious texts are not actually used for swearing in per se; and in the
case of the Minnesota congressman, he posed for the photo with a copy
of the Quran (owned by Thomas Jefferson) after the ceremony. Quoting
from a fact-checking site did not preclude ideologically motivated use
of information. In the entire sample of stories published by partisan
WeChat outlets, there were only several instances of direct sourcing
from English-speaking alt-right media, such as The Daily Caller and
Zero Hedge, but the generation of misinformation did not hinge on
referencing biased and questionable sources.
While polarizing rhetoric on both sides revolved around discrediting
the other side, the right was more concerted in its delegitimization of
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Figure 4.
liberal Democrats. Mentions of liberals dominated right-leaning outlets
while conservatives and liberals were more evenly mentioned on left-
leaning outlets. As many as nine percent of the content generated by
right-leaning outlets made references to liberals using the code words
huazuo (“Chinese left”), baizuo (“White left”), and shabaitian (“sweet
and dumb”). These terms, usually used in a derogatory way, connote
an understanding of liberals as hypocritical and superficial in their
obsession with equality, multiculturalism, and political correctness.17
This narrative has familiar streaks of right-wing populism, echoing
terms such as “social justice warriors” and “libtard,” but contains an
added element of perceived double-standard, where the liberal version
of social justice applies to a host of minorities—African Americans,
Latinos, Muslims, LGBTQ, undocumented immigrants, and felons—
while Chinese Americans are either neglected or sacrificed. The strong
co-occurrence of “liberals” and “discrimination,” much stronger in the
conservative WeChat sphere than in left-leaning outlets (Figure 5), is
one illustration of this baizuo narrative.
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“Executive order by Trump to ban Muslims has taken effect.
Even Green Card holders denied entry.”
100000*
“An investigative report on the Pro-Trump Chinese move-
ment. Don’t miss it!”
61652
“Comprehensive summary of House and Senate tax bill.” 28438
“Macron won! Populism halted in its steps in France.” 27132
“Heartbreaking! Chinese senior shot dead by security guard
while playing Pokemon Go”
26732
“Bush Jr breaks years of silence to criticize current politics” 26658
“Chinese participate in Women’s March” 25136
“At the crossroads: 200 years of Chinese Americans in
Politics—from Chin Foo Wang to Elaine Zhao”
24476
“Don’t let this rookie Minister of Education ruin education in
America”
22461
“Trump’s new tax plan: 12% is only a red herring, software
engineers could see tax increase”
22249
*WeChat displays view count larger than 100,000 as 100,000+
Table 3. Top performing stories on US politics from the left
Figure 5: The size of the nodes is proportional to the frequency that
a term is mentioned, and the thickness of the edges indicates the fre-
quency of co-occurrence between two terms.
Race relations is key to the partisan political discourse on both sides.
Thirty-two percent of the content on the left and twenty-four percent
of the content on the right contained references to more than one of
the five racial or ethnic groups coded in this analysis (White, African
American, Latino, Muslim, Chinese/Asian), with the right being par-
ticularly concerned with the relationship between Muslim and Chinese
(Figure 5). The centrality of race relations in WeChat’s partisan po-
litical discourse has a lot to do with the origin of these outlets and the
progression of Chinese activism that they are part of, which has been
defined by a strong response to perceived discrimination and injustice.
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Figure 5.
On the right, this resolved into a social Darwinist, zero-sum concep-
tion of racial politics, where Chinese empowerment ultimately means
getting what they have always deserved but have been given to other
minority groups unfairly. This argument has been applied to issues such
as undocumented immigration (Chinese immigrants migrated legally),
affirmative action (merit-based admissions), and law and order (hard-
working taxpayers being terrorized by criminals).
To be clear, this narrative is not the only understanding of how to
situate Chinese Americans in the matrix of race, power, and equality.
The left on WeChat has offered interpretations of affirmative action and
census disaggregation that acknowledge the potential for discrimination
without diminishing its importance for all minority groups, revisited the
significance of the civil rights movement for Chinese Americans, and en-
couraged a form of political participation that emphasizes shared inter-
est with other minority groups. I found support for both visions among
my interviewees. Of course, the extent of this conservative turn among
first-generation Chinese remains to be assessed on a larger scale, but it
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is clear that right-leaning outlets are extremely visible on WeChat, and
their politics do find resonance. With this visibility comes the potential
for political socialization. Several interviewees suggested that they were
introduced to US politics by the right-leaning outlets in the months
leading up to the 2016 election, using terms such as “enlightening” and
“educational” to describe their encounter with these outlets.
It is beyond the scope of this report to unpack the complex poli-
tics emerging among first-generation Chinese (although it would be a
very worthwhile enterprise). The foregoing analysis is intended to high-
light two features of political polarization on WeChat: first, right-wing
discourse on WeChat is both forceful and extreme, creating a highly
singular set of ideologies with no moderate voices or alternative per-
spectives; second, both sides are parsing through the role of Chinese
Americans in the racialized political landscape, with the version on the
right tapping into a zero-sum conception. With its visibility, the right
could exert palpable influence on first-generation Chinese politics. In
fact, as I discuss in the next section, right-leaning outlets do play a role
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Unsurprisingly, efforts to flag and track misleading WeChat content
uncovered various types of misinformation in contentious issue areas,
including affirmative action, undocumented immigration, Muslim/Islam,
and law enforcement and public safety, many of which are linked to
right-leaning outlets on WeChat. For example, a story by VNAC stoked
fear by attributing the devastating wildfire in Sonoma County to an
intentional act by an undocumented immigrant. However, rather than
detailing each, it would be most instructive to discuss two widely cir-
culated stories that help illustrate what I consider archetypal elements
of misinformation on WeChat. This is not meant to be an exhaustive
description of misinformation on WeChat, but an exercise in unpack-
ing the dynamics of its origins and manifestations. I lay out the main
building blocks of the two case studies before summarizing a few key
takeaways.
Antifa-Led Civil War
In early November 2017, a story warning readers of mass riots and
Antifa-led civil war appeared in different corners of WeChat. In the
English-language media world, the story’s rise featured a familiar cast
of characters: subculture communities, satirists who were taken as
truths, and conspiracy-inclined far-right outlets such as Infowars and
the Gateway Pundit.18 Headlines of these stories used different variants
of “Antifa plans ‘Civil War’ to overthrow the government” and “Mass
riots may happen across cities in the US.”
VNAC, one of the conservative outlets examined earlier, was the
first to publish the story, and its original article was viewed more than
100,000 times (again, this is when WeChat stops counting). Here, con-
nection with the English-language alt-right sphere was evident. The
Antifa story appeared as part of VNAC’s continued engagement with
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the “truth” of Charlottesville and liberal media’s one-sided demoniza-
tion of the alt-right. It also herded conspiracy theories popular with
the alt-right that suggested George Soros funded Antifa and the Black
Lives Matter movement.
Subsequent circulation of this story on WeChat has been mostly
stripped of far-right ideology. It was aided by a process in which sen-
sational information can catch on through multiplication and piracy by
decentralized outlets. On WeChat, we logged thirty different WeChat
outlets that published this information, which together accumulated at
least 472,625 views. Twenty-two outlets either directly pirated the con-
tent or made minor modifications for their specific audiences. The con-
tent was almost identical across the thirty outlets: a tweet by Trump
USA (@MADE_USA), a list of cities where mass riots would take
place, and a description of Antifa and Black Lives Matters as organi-
zations that practice violence (Photo 1).
Notably, seventeen of the thirty outlets that shared this story were
locally oriented, ranging from all-purpose local news accounts to those
narrowly focusing on housing or classifieds. These are by no means
inconsequential players. As an example of their influence, the story on
the account Chinese in LA accrued a view count of 100,000, on par with
VNAC. While many profit-driven WeChat outlets rely on advertising
for revenue, these local news accounts have an especially ostensible
display of banner ads, ranging from realtors, immigration attorneys,
Chinese schools, and other local Chinese businesses. (Figure 6)
This case illustrates how a conspiratorial idea that was relayed all
the way from the English-language far-right by way of partisan outlets
on WeChat could be amplified through the replication and multipli-
cation of diffuse outlets eager for shareable content. At a time when
political news could easily become fodder for drama and entertainment,
outlets that are not overtly political can tag on and become conveyors
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of political misinformation. Local outlets, in particular, contributed
heavily to this amplification process.
The Curious Case of
Haissam Massalkhy
If the Antifa story was relatively straightforward, another case took
a more meandering trajectory. It revolved around an alleged DUI case,
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in which a Lebanese motorist fatally struck a Chinese jogger in Walnut,
a city west of Los Angeles. What attracted eyeballs was the claim—
often embedded in the headline—that the motorist, Haissam Massalkhy,
was undocumented and had intentionally committed the act to extend
his stay in the US. This story, discussed in the context of California’s
sanctuary state status, triggered intense reactions and has mutated
into claims such as “sanctuary state protects felons” and “crime be-
comes a pathway to green card in California.” Here too, as many as
forty-three different WeChat outlets, of which thirty-four were local in-
formation outlets, published articles that named Massalkhy’s alleged
motive, adding up to 319,581 views.
The strength of the narrative partly derives from its emotional ap-
peal to the absurdity of liberal excess. It has become one of the stories
exemplifying the unthinkable ramifications of sanctuary state, along
with the Kate Steinle verdict, which has received national attention.
California’s other proposed legislations served as part of the extended
Exhibit A. These included a recently passed bill reducing penalty for
knowingly exposing others to HIV, as well as a new law scaling back
lifetime registration for some sex offenders, both of which were subject
to distorted coverage. California, in this narrative, becomes a “sunken
place” where liberal values have run amok, disregarding the safety and
interest of law-abiding citizens to protect illegals (Photo 2). The Mas-
salkhy case, with its unfathomable ludicrousness, was the ultimate
proof.
Yet, substantive misinterpretation of the sanctuary state bill aside,
basic facts about this story remain elusive. Tracing its origin proved
to be a cumbersome task. It was a local story that received very little
coverage in English-language media. One source suggested that Mas-
salkhy’s green card, sponsored by his ex-wife, may be set to expire at
the time of the crash.19 Some reported that the police initially believed
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the act was intentional.20 But no English-speaking source reported the
alleged motive of the defendant. World Journal, a Chinese ethnic press
with local reporters in Southern California, was the single source that
covered the story, reporting that Massalkhy acted to extend his stay
the US.21 Short of accessing court documents, it is impossible to resolve
this discrepancy between World Journal’s reporting and news cover-
age in English. It took peeling away layers of repackaged content to
find the original source of the story, and even then the facts are beyond
recovery.
In contrast to the relative obscurity of this story in English-language
news, the story appeared across Chinese-language media. In addition
to China-based media and Chinese ethnic presses in the US, all ma-
jor message boards, including Wenxuecity, Mitbbs, and Creaders.net,
also picked up the story. These are formidable players in the Chinese-
language information ecosystem. Wenxuecity, for example, boasts close
to three million unique visitors in a thirty-day period, with 60 percent
of total traffic originating from within the United States.22 On Zhihu, a
Quora-like knowledge-sharing site, the topic was viewed 987,045 times.
Known for the caliber of its members, Zhihu is commonly perceived as
a high-end knowledge-sharing community, where the most upvoted an-
swers can stand in for authoritative explanations. More recently, it has
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become a gathering place for Trump enthusiasts.23 On the Massalkhy
case, the top answer piled onto the case even more untruths and bias.
It related “yet another case” in which a Muslim (which Massalkhy may
not have been) purportedly was given a lenient trial after hitting a Chi-
nese girl in the “deep blue state” of New York. In the end, attempts




These two case studies first of all demonstrate the logic of atten-
tion economy and the decentralization of content generation that more
broadly define the digital information environment of today.24 25 Here
we see familiar incentives and tactics at work, where intense compe-
tition among WeChat publishers creates an ecosystem that rewards
speed and sensationalism, contributing to the prevalence of question
headlines,26 emotional hyperbole, and rapid replication of content. A
report by WeChat’s research team released in April 2017 showed the
crowded marketplace of content publishing within WeChat. Of the stag-
gering ten million WeChat outlets, 76.1 percent have fewer than 10,000
subscribers.27 In this hypercompetitive environment, not jumping on a
captivating story such as mass riots rocking US cities means not getting
a share of the attention pie. While better-resourced WeChat outlets
can generate what the platform labels “original content,” others rely
on tweaking headlines and editorializing to make the story stand out
among replicas.
The case studies uncovered a long tail of outlets that wield minimal
influence by themselves, but together their abundance gives misinforma-
tion ample opportunity to multiply, distorting or masking the original
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source. As Jonathan Stray explains, quantity does matter, as “receiving
a message via multiple modes and from multiple sources increases the
message’s perceived credibility, especially if a disseminating source is
one with which an audience member identifies.”28 Combined with the
abundance of weak-tie chat groups, which I examine in more detail in
the next section, decentralization and replication of content production
on WeChat creates the conditions for repeated exposure, familiarity,
and “impressions” that may work cumulatively and subconsciously to
shape attitudes.29
Efforts to debunk these stories did exist but did not do nearly as
well. In both these cases, NoMelonGroup, introduced in the previ-
ous section, published debunking articles. Counting reposts by part-
ner outlets, its article on Antifa-led civil war was viewed about 11,000
times, and its article clarifying California’s sanctuary laws in reference
to the Massalkhy case was viewed a little over 4,000 times. Counter-
narratives, already having to swim upstream,30 31 do not benefit from
the same long tail of outlets latching onto provocative content.
It also needs to be mentioned that the ease of self-publishing has
generated excellent research and analysis on social and political issues
which serve to connect the immigrant audiences with social and polit-
ical discussions in the U.S. But the cumulative influence of cheap and
fast information can be formidable.
Localization of Misinformation
Local information outlets tapping into overseas Chinese audiences
for revenue heavily contributed to the spread of misinformation as they
jumped onto the bandwagon sometimes steered by partisan outlets.
The same competition among WeChat publishers dictates the work
of startups focusing on North-American users. For example, for Los
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Angeles alone, there are four different WeChat outlets vying for local
audience. It goes without saying that there are financial incentives for
cheaply creating locally relevant but emotionally resonant messages for
the immigrant Chinese audience. But here the overt bias and politiciza-
tion displayed by many of these supposedly non-political local outlets
could suggest an assumption on their part about the beliefs and values
of their imagined audience.
These outlets convey some very useful information, including events,
business and consumer information, crime, and political information.
Social ties and information are especially crucial for immigrants as they
navigate the new places, customs, institutions, and social processes that
define their new reality.32 The practicality of local information outlets
could create a strong dependency relationship with immigrant Chinese,
especially when they rush in to fill a gap in local news. There is already
some initial evidence of consolidation of power. One of the bigger op-
erations is a network of twenty local outlets, which could adapt and
cross-post the same content to a dispersed audience.
Misinformation also takes on a geographical expression as Chinese-
concentrated areas become the focus of news coverage. As cities and
suburbs33 become immigration destinations, they also create media
markets for locally-oriented WeChat outlets. Especially on issues such
as sanctuary cities and census disaggregation, local policies have be-
come focal points of coverage and action.
Relatedly, what the Massalkhy story in particular throws into re-
lief is the lack of credible local reporting—lack of local reporting, pe-
riod34 35—that could serve as a countervailing force to dominant nar-
ratives. While the Antifa story could be easily contradicted by main-
stream English-language media coverage, the construction of the Mas-
salkhy case was cemented by Chinese-language reporting, with insuf-
ficient clues to confirm or challenge basic facts in the narrative. Many
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have cautioned that the decline in local news weakens civic infrastruc-
tures for communities and could leave a vacuum for misinformation to
flourish.36 37 This study provides a stark illustration of this possibility.
A Different Set of Players
and Discourses
While the Antifa story dovetails with ideas and players the English-
speaking media world is acquainted with, not all Chinese-language mis-
information has a familiar ring. The Massalkhy case is an example of a
distorted story that was previously unknown to non-Chinese audiences.
WeChat is situated in a transnational media space that intersects with
both English-speaking and Chinese-language players in the information
ecosystem. Like the hybrid place many immigrants occupy, political
information in immigrant Chinese media also sits at the confluence of
two public spheres and draws rhetorical and ideological resources from
both. In addition to players and discourses originating from the US, the
larger Chinese online public supplies its own subcultures, influencers,
and ideologies. The response to the Massalkhy case on Zhihu reflects
this intersection.
As an additional example, the conservative WeChat sphere has been
able to leverage and import Islamophobia from Chinese internet to
heighten the sense of fear and panic. Several alarmist articles published
by VNAC and Civil Rights cited the banning of non-Halal food on
Chinese flights and university campuses in China, and the construc-
tion of lavish Mosques in poverty-stricken areas in Western China,
where concentrated Chinese Muslim population reside. In China, Is-
lamophobia has been finding a sounding board in Chinese versions of
Twitter, Quora, and Reddit.38 These discursive agents and dogmas
formed around them—relatively unfamiliar to researchers and me-
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dia practitioners—also contribute to the circulation of misinformation
and shape its meanings as well as resonances. More systematic efforts
are needed to identify agents and discourses involved in the Chinese-
language information problem, and to unravel the relationship among
them.
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Figure 6.
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One final and distinctive feature of the information problem on
WeChat is its relatively algorithm-free design. On WeChat, users en-
counter content in three primary ways where the influence of technolog-
ical manipulation is markedly absent. First, users can subscribe to news
accounts directly, and all subscriptions show up in a tab in the order in
which they were last updated. Second, content sharing can be found in
Moments, akin to Facebook’s News Feed but always sorted chronologi-
cally. Third, information circulates in the many private, invitation-only
chat groups populating WeChat. This set of content exposure and cu-
ration process makes information flows in WeChat a distinctly socially
driven experience, where the paths and fault lines of information, as
well as misinformation, are determined by organic networks and their
varying degrees of affinity and trust.
Compared to the two forms of social curation on WeChat, personal
curation plays a more minor role in exposing users to information.
Eighty-seven percent of the respondents reported reading an article
posted by a friend in the week prior to the survey, and seventy-nine
percent had read an article shared in a chat group, compared to fifty-
seven who had actively browsed a subscribed news account (Photo 3).
This is not surprising. Since all subscriptions show up in a separate tab,
customizing and browsing content from subscription accounts becomes
a much more intentional act. Perhaps even more so than other social
media platforms, the strength of this personal curation process inside
WeChat depends on the individual’s level of interest and motivation.
Chat groups emerged as a central mode of organization on WeChat.
As many as ninety-two percent of the survey respondents reported
belonging to a chat group. These range from smaller, more intimate
groups formed with family members, friends, and colleagues, to groups
organized around shared interests, affiliations, or locality where mem-
bership is subject to approval by the administrator. Examples given by
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survey respondents included parenting groups, local Chinese groups,
professional networks, alumni groups, and hometown groups. Groups
can also be formed ad hoc, around a certain event or topic. The abun-
dance of these chat groups makes them a key process in the spread of
information on WeChat.
It is chat groups that make the outcome of information flows on
WeChat much more indeterminate. When one thinks of social networks
driving information sharing, emails and friends networks on social me-
dia like Facebook may come to mind. These have been most commonly
studied as a source of social curation.39 40 But WeChat groups oper-
ate differently from Facebook and email networks: they can be larger
and connected by much weaker relations. For example, group members
could be the 200 odd graduates of the Peking University who currently
live in Boston. These weak ties—acquaintances or mere individuals con-
nected by a common affiliation—could potentially convey a larger and
broader body of information. Among survey respondents, strong-tie
groups with fewer than fifteen people are most common, but as many as
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seventy-one percent reported belonging to a group larger than 100 peo-
ple. My interviews and observations point to a few features of WeChat
chat groups that could complicate existing understandings of how social
curation shapes information flows.
First, the degree of information exposure could depend on discussion
and elaboration. In larger groups, interactions can quickly get buried.
What prolongs the visibility of a shared article is engagement from
other group members. As one interviewee said, “I do not always check
messages from chat groups, but if I see a series of message alerts, I
know something must be happening and I would be curious to read.” In
other words, if a shared article triggers discussion, it may be viewed by
more group members. This suggests contentious topics may get viewed
more.
Second, sharing within a chat group does not necessarily signal
“endorsement and social recommendation”/autocitemessing to other
group members. In fact, disagreements are frequent occurrences. Espe-
cially with contentious issues, disagreement sometimes led to members
splintering off to regroup with like-minded people. One interviewee re-
counted a parents group splitting into Ivy League and non-Ivy League
groups following disagreement over affirmative action. In the period
leading up to the 2016 election, when chat groups were dominated by
political discussions, some group administrators responded by push-
ing out the over-zealous to form a separate group. Chat groups are
therefore dynamic and constantly evolving, and along with it group
heterogeneity is not a stable construct.
Messaging apps similar to WeChat, such as Whatsapp, Line, and
Kakaotalk, are increasingly becoming venues for sharing and discussing
news.41 More like chain emails than social media, these apps are prin-
cipally organized around affinity-based ties and private networks. The
dynamics of these group networks have significant implications for how
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misinformation spreads and how echo chambers manifest in a more pri-
vate platform like WeChat. This is a piece of the puzzle that warrants
much more systematic research.
In May 2017, WeChat added the feature Top Stories, a tab with
personalized news recommendations. This means WeChat’s content
exposure mechanisms may see a gradual shift toward algorithmic cu-
ration. But for now, the spread of misinformation on WeChat, in the
absence of bots,42 micro-targeting,43 and other technologically derived





Conclusion and Lessons 55
Misinformation on WeChat is the joint outcome of ideological forces
on the platform and dynamics of content production and distribution.
These forces and dynamics bear parallels with digital news ecosystems
more broadly. Decentralization of content publishing and the logic of
the attention economy drive rampant clickbait headlines, emotional
hyperbole, editorializing, and disregard for source verification, provid-
ing conditions for misinformation to circulate. But more specific to
immigrant Chinese media, WeChat’s information problem takes place
more on the local level, manifests on a different set of issues, and inter-
sects with players and discourses both in the United States and China.
Information flows on WeChat are still by and large a product of per-
sonal and social curation. Chat groups, diffuse and abundant, provide
countless nodes for the distribution of information through weak-tie
networks.
Without diminishing algorithmic accountability and the role of plat-
forms in shaping information flows, findings from WeChat in many
ways reinforce the important point that danah boyd and others have
made about the cultural tensions underlying the spread of misinforma-
tion.45 46 Many of the issues prone to misinformation harken back to
the position of Chinese Americans in the social and political hierarchy
of the US. While right-wing political discourse in the Chinese media
ecosystem is highly problematic, underlying its strident tone on affir-
mative action, census disaggregation, and treatment of Muslims, it’s
an appeal to unfairness and invisibility that could find wider resonance
among immigrant Chinese. Most importantly, this invisibility can be
seen as systemically produced, where Chinese Americans have been
overlooked and disempowered, even vis-à-vis other racial minorities, in
the social and political agenda. Studies have shown that Asian Ameri-
cans are chronically underexposed to mobilization by political parties.47
A national survey on intergroup attitudes revealed that Asian Ameri-
Tow Center for Digital Journalism
56 Misinformation On WeChat
cans, while least described with negative traits by other groups, are also
the least understood—the perpetual foreigner.48
Herein lies the primary cause of concern: perception of discrimina-
tion and anxiety among first-generation Chinese exist and are tied to
very legitimate concerns and experiences; while they do not always ex-
press themselves in radical politics, news accounts—including but not
limited to the partisan ones—could leverage these sentiments, aided
by an ecosystem that is populated by opportunist content producers
and designed to enable the circulation of misinformation. When polit-
ical socialization is conducted within this information environment, it
could fuel a type of politics hinging on more ethnocentric and zero-sum
conceptions of interests.
Part of the answer to the information problem, I think, entails under-
standing these concerns and experiences. It includes asking, for exam-
ple, why affirmative action as it is practiced now can be uncomfortable
for even progressive Chinese. Or how being associated with wealth and
targeted for crime may not be the best introduction to racial dynamics.
It involves addressing the disconnect between Chinese and American
issue agendas and news coverage. Fiona Ng, a reporter and producer
for the Los Angeles-based KPCC, described herself as the only repre-
sentative from English-language media in a press conference hosted by
Chinese Americans for Trump.49 She has since started following their
discussions on WeChat’s chat groups.
This brings me to the next point: more English-speaking media, gov-
ernment agencies, and community organizations should utilize WeChat
as tool for two-way communication. I say two-way because the misin-
formation problem identified in this study requires listening as much
as delivering correct information. Using WeChat means more than just
joining the app. If closed chat groups are where information circulates
and conversations take place, there is no easy workaround other than
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making real connections with individuals and communities. In this
sense, WeChat serves as a reminder that dedicated engagement, more
than technical solutions, is needed to combat misinformation.
In addition, substantial and credible local news is more crucial than
ever for immigrant groups, especially on stories and policy issues prone
to misinterpretation and distorted, or informationally incomplete. And
these local news need to be accessible—in the right language as well
as delivered through the right channels—to the immigrant population.
The local news nonprofit Alhambra Source, which grew out of a re-
search initiative at University of Southern California’s Annenberg
School for Communication and Journalism, is an example of local jour-
nalism taking seriously the work of immigrant integration. Operating
in a majority-minority suburb of Los Angeles, it has cultivated an eth-
nically and linguistically diverse base of resident contributors from the
local area, which allows surfacing of issues and stories relevant to immi-
grant audiences. In addition to efforts in trilingual reporting (English,
Spanish and Chinese), it also runs a dedicated WeChat account to con-
nect Chinese residents with local issues and institutions. While such an
extensive model of engagement may not be viable for all, ethnic press
and existing WeChat outlets can be leveraged as partners for dissem-
inating verified information. For example, laudable efforts in rumor
tracking and counter-narratives have already been initiated by WeChat
natives such as NoMelonGroup and iAmElection. Local chat groups
would also be helpful networks to tap into.
Traditional ethnic media should not be discounted when new, WeChat-
based players seem to have seized sizeable audience and discursive au-
thority. Historically, ethnic media have had formidable influence on
Chinese politics. From not endorsing Judy Chu’s city council bid in
the 1990s50 to its editorials on affirmative action, ethnic media can also
sway Chinese politics in a partisan direction. But these outlets could
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be vehicles of verified information. Others have observed that the ex-
plosion in “news” being generated and shared across digital and social
media could lower the bar for news organizations.51 Ethnic media are
already known to face challenges in accessing sources.52 With the in-
creasing number of information outlets vying for attention, we need
to ask how ethnic presses have responded to the change in their con-
tent and audience engagement strategies, and how they can be allies in
combating misinformation.
I want to conclude by emphasizing that this is as much a case study
of the Chinese media sphere and its particular narratives, players, and
processes as it is an opportunity to reflect on immigrant Chinese and
their media system as part of the larger political landscape in the
United States. Similarly, we need to learn about what the Tagalog,
Spanish, and Hindi news ecosystems look like and how narratives are
constructed within those spheres. Many of the most divisive political
issues are defined in relational terms. It is through understanding di-
vergences and intersections in the political discourses of different groups
and political constituencies that we can identify the sources and gaps of
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affirmative action, data disaggregation
细分, 平权法案, AA, 平权
Unauthorized
immigration
Sanctuary city, sanctuary state, sanctuary law, illegal immi-
gration, undocumented, unauthorized immigration, DACA,
dreamers
梦想法案, DACA, Dreamers, 非法移民, 无证移民, 庇护城, 庇护州
Bathroom Bill Transgender bill, transgender bathroom, bathroom bill
跨性别, 变性, 厕所法, 厕所令, 同厕, 跨性别厕所, 自认性别
White
Supremacy
White supremacy, White nationalist, White supremacist, Black
Lives Matter, BLM
白人至上, 白人民族, 黑命贵, 也是命, Black Lives Matter, BLM
Jobs and the
economy
taxation reform, tax cut, unemployment rate, minimum wage
税改, 减税, 税收, 失业率, 最低工资
Gun control Gun control
控枪, 枪支控制
Terrorism Terrorist attack, terrorism
恐袭, 恐怖袭击, 恐怖主义
Muslim/Islam Muslim, Islam, travel ban, muslim ban
穆斯林, 限穆令, 伊斯兰, 清真, 和平教, 绿教, 禁穆令, 穆斯林禁令, 排
穆令, 禁穆, 入境令
Climate change Climate change, global warming
全球变暖, 气候变化
Female health Abortion, reproductive right
堕胎, 生育权
Healthcare Obamacare, healthcare
歐記, 欧记, 健保, 医保
Public safety Public safety, crime rate, decriminalization, decriminalize
治安, 犯罪率, 去罪
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Racial Groups Search terms with English Translation
Asian/Chinese 亚裔 (Asian), 华人 (Chinese), 华裔 (Chinese)
African American 非裔 (African American), 黑人 (Black), 黑墨 (Black and Latino)
Hispanic 拉丁裔 (Latino), 西裔 (Hispanic), 西语裔 (Spanish-speaking), 墨
西哥裔 (Mexican descent), 墨西哥人 (Mexicans), 黑墨 (Black and
Latino)
Muslim 穆斯林 (Muslim), 伊斯兰 (Islam), 和平教 (religion of peace), 绿绿
(greens), 绿教 (green religion), 清真 (Halal)
White 欧裔 (European), 白人 (White)
Political Groups Search terms with English translation
Liberal 白 左 (white left), 傻 白 甜 (sweet and dumb), 华 左 (Chinese
left), 极左 (extreme left), 左翼 (left-wing), 左派 (leftist), 民主党
(Democrat)
Conservative 右派 (rightist), 右翼 (right-wing), 共和党 (Republican), 保守派
(conservative), 极右 (extreme right), 另类右翼 (alt-right), 另类右
派 (alt-right), alt-right
Concepts/Values Search terms with English translation
Racial discrimination 种族主义 (racism), 歧视 (discrimination)
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US College Daily 78042 No
Huaren Life 61153 No
Insight China 61433 No
NYC Master 19419 Yes
US Info 168 15552 No
Seattle Rainier 6936 No
Voice of North American
Chinese
8178 No
Chinese in LA 18024 Yes
CN Politics 6090 No
About Bay Area 5987 Yes
Sinovision 9608 No
Voice of Chinese Americans 4173 No
Global US 7128 No
Chinese in New York 7700 Yes
Houston Online 3912 Yes
New Yorker 6090 Yes
Chinese Americans 4944 No
Chinese in Atlanta 2842 Yes
IAmElection 1501 No
Civil Rights 6061 No
Flying PKU 5660 No
NoMelonGroup 4192 No
Anti-Rumor 3324 No
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